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Satellite: A Proposal for
a Global/Regional System
Bryan Adamson is a graduate student and
James C. Hsiung is an assistant professor
in the department of communication at
Purdue University.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the possibility of establishing a
global/regional direct broadcast satellite (DBS) system.' Albeit, in the past,
there have been a number of initiatives aimed at forging a unified global DBS
system, such initiatives have not been successful.2 The most significant bar-
riers (political, rather than technical in nature) existing in the international
negotiating arenas were spillover, equal access, privacy, national sovereignty,
the free flow of information, prior consent, and cultural invasion.3 Although
not all of these issues have been fully resolved, the time has come again for
seriously considering the implementation of an international DBS system.
It may seem strange at this time to propose the establishment of a global
DBS system, while the sole existing International Satellite Organization-
1. We define a global DBS system as an organization that operates a common-carrier
type of DBS system under delegated authority by all participating countries. The
organization is similar to the International Satellite Organization (INTELSAT).
However, to eliminate problems of competition, such as those presently faced by
INTELSAT, this global DBS system will be divided into individual regional systems
and operations that will be more suitable to the immediate needs of a particular
region and the countries within it. It also should be noted that a DBS system here
is using high-powered satellites with transponder output power of 100 watts or more.
2. N.M. MATTE, AEROSPACE LAw: TELECOMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES 13(1982); and K.M.
QUEENEY, DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITES AND THE UNITED NATIONS 64-95 (1978).
3. Powell, Toward a Negotiable Definition of Propaganda for International Agreements
Related to Direct Broadcast Satellites, LAW AND COMTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 3-37
(Winter 1982).
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INTELSAT-is facing the problems of competition, if not dismantling, due
to the proliferation of national and regional satellite systems. However, our
assertion is primarily derived from four recent developments.
I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
First, the issue of equal access has risen once again, now being debated
as equitable access.4 The debate today centers upon its definition and applica-
tion with respect to the "first come, first served" orbital assigning process,
and technical requisites for access to the geostationary orbit (GSO). As some
less-developed and developing countries are expanding their use of telecom-
munications, in light of the realization of information access being crucial
in playing a role in world affairs, they do not wish to be deprived of access,
nor relegated to the use of more advanced, expensive technology (such as
high-priced dishes) in order to be guaranteed legal access.6 This fracture in
negotiations between highly developed and less developed countries brings
an urgency to international cooperation.
Second, the plan of deploying national DBS systems is not as rosy and
promising as anticipated. For example, the withdrawal of many potential DBS
operators in the U.S. demonstrates the economic constraints and financial
uncertainties of establishing and supporting a DBS system within a country?
In addition, trade-offs of a system designed in space and ground segments,
considerations of marketing and management, competition from the existing
media, and changes in technologies are all affecting the implementation and
success of a national DBS system8 Perhaps the technological and economic
4. Segal, ITU Plenipotentiary and Beyond: A Case for Serious Foreign Policy, TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS POLICY 332 (December 1983).
5. Wigand, Direct Satellite Broadcasting: Selected Social Implications, in COMMUNICA-
TION YEARBOOK 6, 250-286 (1984).
6. Supra note 4.
7. Although there are several countries contemplating national and regional DBS
systems in Europe and there is a successful DBS system in Japan, a private DBS
system such as in the United States suggests insurmountable financial restraints,
not only because of upfront costs, but also because of competition from existing
media. Staggering development, if not failure, of DBS systems in the U.S. market
has indicated these difficulties. See also Launch Failures Changing Satellite Business
BROADCASTING, 57 (July 14, 1986); Fliep, Worldwide Commercial Communications
Satellite Market, VIA SATELLITE 30 (January 1986); Pirard, The U.K.'s DBS Dilemma,
SATELLITE COMMUNICAnONs 32-33 (August 1985); In Brief, BROADCASTING 168 (January
12, 1987).
8. Marin, DBS Systems: Perspective for a Profit Seeking Company, TELECOMMUNICA-nONS
POLICY 291-300 (December 1985). James C. Hsiung, Status and Implications of
Federal Regulation of Direct Broadcast Satellite, Chapter 4 (Bowling Green, OH:
unpublished dissertation, 1984).
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requirements and risks for a DBS system are beyond a particular country's
capability. The benefits and pragmatism of DBS may be realized only through
an international system.
Third, the transformation of European DBS systems from state to private
ownership has brought up a few key issues regarding competition and co-
ordination? System operators are also concerned with the potentially inade-
quate amount of programming available, who will provide it, and at what cost.
Further complicating this shift toward privatization of European regional DBS
systems are the diverse regulatory approaches of the negotiating countries.'0
Here again rises the necessity for international cooperation, as well as effec-
tive coordination between regional and national systems.
Fourth, the World Administrative Radio Conference 1985 (WARC-85)
proved to be one driven by politics and ideology. I The International Telecom-
munications Union (ITU), the governing body that sets policy for operating
international satellite systems, is ill equipped to fight off the politicization
to which it has fallen prey.12 The conflict, once again, is between those highly
developed and less-developed (and developing) countries, and several (the U.S.
in particular) are seriously reconsidering their role within the ITU, and the
possibility of reaching agreements amenable to so many interests. This
dilemma, along with examples set by the Arab Satellite Communications
Organization (ARABSAT), the European Telecommunications Satellite
Organization (EUTELSAT), and other established or developing regional
systems, illustrates the assertion that regional planning is apparently being
viewed as a more viable avenue of ensuring the attainment of national objec-
tives as related to DBS.'
3
Alongside the resurgence of old issues, and the rise of new ones, is the
advancement in satellite technology that seems to promise to address problems
such as spill-over, national sovereignty, and prior consent. Strides in signal-
scrambling technology and restrictions on receive-only dishes may provide
means of resolving concerns long plaguing global DBS telecommunications. 14
9. Pricing, Coordination Issues Top INTELSAT Agenda, BROADCASTING 49 (October 7,
1985); and Will DBS Meet the Same Fate as in U.S.? BROADCASTING 58, 60 (January
27, 1986).
10. The Privatization of Europe, BROADCASTING 61 (March 31, 1986).
11. The Way It Was and Wasn't at WARC '85, BROADCASTING 70-72 (November 4, 1985);
and Mahoney, Space WARC '85: Negotiating Competitive Forces, J. CoM. 60-61
(Summer 1985).
12. U.S. May Seek Improvements in ITU Procedures, BROADCASTING 40-42 (November
11, 1985).
13. Snow, Arguments for and against Competition in International Satellite Facilities and
Services: A U.S. Perspective, J. COM. 51-59, 62-79 (Summer 1985).
14. Powell, supra note 3.
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Bearing these developments in mind, our intent here is to provide a pro-
posal showing that an international DBS system is not only technically and
politically possible, but is economically feasible as well. This will be done
first through a historical explication of the major technical, political, and
economic constraints, followed by an examination of the advantages of
establishing a global/regional DBS system. After an analysis of viable solu-
tions to the major issues faced today, a summary of a proposed plan for an
international DBS system will be given.
However, before presenting our discussion, two notions need to be made
clear. First, since there is no global system in existence, many arguments ex-
amined in this article are based on the problems currently faced by INTELSAT,
which is an international organization similar to the global DBS system being
proposed here. Second, although INTELSAT is mainly a fixed satellite ser-
vice (FSS) as opposed to a broadcast satellite service (BSS) and may not reflect
the real problems of a global DBS system, this technical incompatibility does
not affect our contentions and the needs of establishing a global DBS system. 5
Moreover, based on the Final Acts of Region Two Radio Administrative Con-
ference of 1983, "transponders on space stations in the FSS may be used ad-
ditionally for transmission in the BSS" as long as the transmission does not
exceed designated power and cause harmful interference.'
6
H. BACKGROUND ISSUES SURROUNDING
INTERNATIONAL DBS
A sharing of information across national boundaries was one of the
primary goals of satellite communication when the U.S. National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) and the American Telegraph and Telephone
Company (AT&T) launched Telstar back in 1962. The transmission of broad-
cast signals through the global commons prompted the need to create an in-
ternational organization to govern and develop a world satellite system. The
15. Based on the definition of the 1971 World Administrative Radio Conference for Space
Telecommunications, FSS was defined as "A radiocommunication [sic] service be-
tween earth stations at specified fixed points when one or more satellites are used;
in some cases this service includes satellite-to-satellite links...." BSS was defined
as "A radiocommunication [sic] service in which signals transmitted or retransmit-
ted by space stations are intended for direct reception by the general public." In-
ternational Telecommunication Union, Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio
Conference for Space Telecommunications (Geneva: July 17, 1971).
16. International Telecommunication Union, Final Acts of Regional Administrative Radio
Conference for the Planning of the Broadcasting Satellite Service in Region Two,
part III, p. 2 (Geneva: June/July, 1983).
6 February 1988
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U.S. signatory Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), which
became manager of INTELSAT in 1964, was assigned this task. In 1965,
INTELSAT's Early Bird satellite was an attestation to its commitment to
development; the Early Bird captured and relayed not only broadcast signals,
but also computer, telephone, and weather data, as well as two-way radio.
Later satellites, particularly the INTELSAT IV-A series during the 1970s, were
designed to further improve technological efficiency through beam separa-
tion and more powerful antenna systems. 7 This progressive trend has con-
tinued through to the present INTELSAT VI satellites, providing up to 40,000
voice and two-color video circuits simultaneously. 8
Of course, along with the development of DBS systems over the past two
and one-half decades have been policy agreements and negotiations concern-
ing their applications. If the evolution of this communication technology has
any significance at all in the international fora, it is, indeed, to reaffirm the
interdependence of nations.' 9 Certainly, with respect to satellite technology,
there has been concerted and conscious efforts made toward ensuring inter-
national cooperation and coordination.
Although advocation of a definitive international DBS system was attemp-
ted, major barriers-political, technical, and economic in nature--discouraged
the realization of such an advancement. These barriers centered around the
issues of free flow of information, national sovereignty, prior consent, spill-
over, and access. 20
All of these concerns were debated by various countries in several bodies
of the United Nations throughout the 1960s, but few were resolved on an
international level.2 During the 1970s, the position among various countries
became polarized regarding the implementation and regulation of DBS systems,
even though the technology for DBS was available. It was clear then that parti-
cipation in a global DBS system was not likely in the foreseeable future unless
these issues could be resolved.
Nevertheless, countries that could afford them were not discouraged from
establishing national DBS systems. Effective spectrum allocation-and system
coordination consequently-became tantamount. Thus, at WARC-71, the ITU
adopted a resolution requiring countries to utilize all technical means available
in keeping signal spill-over to a minimum. This legislation served to prevent
unwanted broadcasts from impeding sovereign states' territories. 2 Three subse-
17. L. MARTINEZ, COMMUNICATION SATELLITES: POWER POLITICS IN SPACE 4 (1985).
18. J. BITTNER, BROADCASTING AND TELECOMMUNICATION 143 (1985).
19. Powell, supra note 3, at 5.
20. Id.
21. QUEENEY, supra note 2, at 3-12.
22. Id. at 90-94; see also MARTINEZ, supra note 17, for a discussion of WARC-71, the
Final Acts of WARC-71, and the 1973 Plenipotentiary Conference, at 116-119.
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quent conferences (WARC-77, General WARC-79, and the Regional Adminis-
trative Radio Conference-83) drafted a World Agreement and Associated Plan
for implementation of DBS in ITU Regional countries and adopted an "a priori
plan" of allocation of frequencies and orbital positions.2 3 Moreover, at
WARC-85, all ITU member states were provided rights of access to the GSO
for satellite communication and DBS systems. These developments have helped
all countries preserve, to an extent, their national integrity, and given less
developed and developing countries in particular, a more significant influence
over international policy related to DBS communication.34 These strides toward
international accord are indeed noteworthy. However, as we shall see, con-
flicts related to free flow of information, national sovereignty, prior consent,
spill-over, and access have yet to be resolved in a real sense, as issues of the
past have become clouded by new concerns.
Before addressing the present barriers to establishing an international DBS
system, it is important to revisit the old and new promises such a system holds.
Ill. ADVANTAGES OF A GLOBAL DBS SYSTEM
Fundamentally, there are four major advantages to having access to and
use of DBS technology and service on a global basis.
First, it eliminates the need to establish an intensive, high-cost, terrestrial
communication network for audio, data, and voice transmission. Many coun-
tries face natural and man-made barriers to constructing communication
networks. Deserts, mountain ranges, rivers, buildings, and other structures
impede conventional telecommunication systems.
Further, cables and wires, as they stretch across miles, increase costs
of equipment, construction, and maintenance, and become economically
inefficient. Although initially "expensive," a global DBS network offers many
advantages over terrestrial systems, with costs and construction being indepen-
dent of distance, and required equipment being minimal. Moreover, it is a
sole means by which to reach a whole population within a given geographic
area2 5 Typically, one DBS satellite transponder can transmit or broadcast high-
quality radio or television programs to an entire country, thus linking hundreds
of villages and cities. A global DBS system will possess not only the tradi-
23. QUEENEY, supra note 2, and Hsiung, supra note 8, at ch. 2; and SIGNITZER, infra
note 29.
24. MARTINEZ, supra 17, at 115-131.
25. Only DBS satellites have the capability of generating sufficient EIRP (effective
isotropic radiated power) to cover a large geographic area and provide acceptable
signals with small ground equipment.
8 February 1988
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tional satellite functions of carrying video, voice, and data information, but
also eliminates the need for separate communication networks. Instrumenta-
tion and capacity make DBS the most practicable means for a telecommunica-
tions infrastructure-domestically, regionally, and globally.
Second, it increases information exchange and flow. A global DBS system
can bring many economic and political benefits to a nation. From an economic
standpoint, access to a global DBS system may transform the local marketplace
into, quite literally, a worldwide one. With DBS, international franchises and
companies potentially possess a wider market, meaning increased profits.
Further, with direct and expedient access to price and product information,
greater competition and more sound decision making is had. By the same
token, activity surrounding the collection, organization, and dissemination
of information services spurs growth in other economic sectors.2 6
Third, a global DBS system could also mean growth in the political sector.
A DBS system may be an expeditious method for establishing telecommunica-
tions in countries where unstable governments wish to consolidate diverse
ethnic and social groups.2 7 Governments could also realize the utility of DBS
systems for security by providing international communication ties between
themselves, their allies, and military forces.28 So, by facilitating information
links vital to economic and political stability and growth, a global DBS system
would be beneficial to developed, developing, and less-developed countries.
Finally, it creates more means of television distribution for entertainment,
educational, and instructional purposes. The most appealing and significant
advantage of a worldwide DBS system is its capability to transmit knowledge
and facilitate growth and development in all parts of the world. Cases in point:
the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) sponsored
a project that used the Applications Technology Satellite (ATS-6) to broad-
cast educational material and augment existing classroom courses directly
into junior high schools located in remote ,areas of the Rocky Mountains 9
Also, the National Education Association employed the ATS-6 to interconnect
teachers in Appalachia and Alaska areas, and to provide seminars through
videoconferences. 30
26. BITTNER, supra 18, at 13.
27. MARTINEZ, supra 17, at 32.
28. Id. at 16-23.
29. B. SIGNITZER, REGULATION OF DIRECT BROADCASTING FROM SATELLITE 15 (1976).
30. NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, APPALASKA INTERCOM: REPORT OF THE NEA'S SATELLITE
EXPERIMENT-1977 (1977).
Communications and the Law 9
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Many other communication projects have demonstrated great improve-
ments in medical care and education by bringing about better access to doctors
and training personnel. 31 With programs such as the Rural Satellite Program
subsidized by the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), educators
and physicians in Tarapoto and Lima, Peru have received programs such as
in-service training, information sessions and premedical treatment diagnoses?2
ATS-6 service satellites have also transmitted both video and audio conferences
to these regions, bringing agricultural planning and community development
programming as well. With the success of these projects, AID has expanded
its efforts in Peru, the West Indies, and Indonesia. 3 Although not yet meeting
unbridled success, these endeavors point to significant initiatives aimed at
seeing that underdeveloped areas receive the benefits of DBS services, and
are incorporated into the existing global telecommunications networks.
Perhaps the most comprehensive manifestation of the promise of DBS
was the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE). With ATS-6,
the Indian government and NASA provided satellite television and radio
receivers for 2,000 remote villages. Educational programs in health, hygiene,
and agriculture were broadcast.34 For the first time, all regions of the Indian
subcontinent were joined into a national information network. Villagers saw
live pictures and heard the voice of Indira Gandhi-an exemplification of the
tacit ties between themselves and the centers of cultural and political authority."
Efficient and effective linking of isolated regions, establishing political and
cultural solidarity, all the while enhancing the quality of life of millions cer-
tainly appears realizable, given DBS technology and services. Citing these
advantages and possibilities, we see the appeal and necessity to consider the
institution of an international, global DBS system.
IV. A GLOBAL DBS SYSTEM
Through a global DBS system, less-developed countries could gain ac-
cess to telecommunication services not otherwise afforded to them, and
industrialized countries may continue to share the technology and coopera-
31. Kelley, Satellites: Silent Partner for LDCs, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 315-318
(December 1982).
32. Smith, Reaching Those Hard to Get Places, SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS 31-32
(November 1985); and Bennett, An Inverted Peace Corps? SATELLITE COMMUNICA-
TIONS 32-37 (July 1986).
33. Id.
34. S.W. HEAD, WORLD BROADCAST SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 44-45 (1985).
35. MARTINEZ, supra note 17, at 33; and SIGNITZER, supra note 29, at 15-16.
10 February 1988
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tion needed to work within such a system .36 As of now, 161 ITU member coun-
tries have interests in utilizing DBS, and demand is on the increase.a7 With
this, one certainly can see the rationale behind the implementation of a global
DBS system.
To do so, however, requires a consideration of important concerns present-
ly hampering international cooperation and faced by the organization that now
provides satellite service on comparable scale, INTELSAT. Although these
arguments are mainly surrounding INTELSAT, which is an FSS as opposed
to a BSS, and might not reflect the real problems of a global DBS system,
it is conceivable that a global DBS system we have proposed, similar to
INTELSAT, could face identical problems. Additionally, although the advan-
tages of DBS outlined earlier may indeed be apparent and promising, "old"
issues of free flow of information, national sovereignty, prior consent, spill-
over, and access as well as "new" concerns of privatization and politiciza-
tion must be dealt with. These issues, then, will be discussed next, subsum-
ed under the central concerns of competition, coordination, and equitable ac-
cess. Assertions will be offered towards ways by which a multiadministrative,
global DBS system may cope with these concerns.
V. COMPETITION
Events in recent history point to an increase in competition within the
international telecommunications markets. For years, many regional satellite
systems such as ARABSAT and EUTELSAT have been competing with
INTELSAT in providing telecommunications services and facilities for pro-
fit.38 And recently, pursuant to national deregulatory policy, the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) has granted conditional authority to five U.S.
companies to compete against INTELSAT.39
36. BITTNER, supra note 18, at 138-145; and HEAO, supra note 34, at 36-40.
37. Curtain Going up on Space WARC, BROADCASTING 74 (August 5, 1985); and The Way
It Was and Wasn't at WARC '85, supra note 11, at 71.
38. Snow, supra note 13.
39. Federal Communications Commission, "In the Matter of Establishment of Satellite
Systems Providing International Communications,' Notice of Inquiry and Propos-
ed Rulemaking, January 4, 1985; Kerver, Taking a Second Look, SATELLITE COM-
MUNICATIONS 20-22 (May 1986); and PanAmsat Signs Peru as First Partner, BROAD-
CASTING 44-45 (April 14, 1986). Five companies that have received authority from
the FCC to provide international communications are: Orion Satellite Corporation,
International Satellite, Inc., RCA American Communications, Inc., Cygnus Satellite
Corporation, and PanAmerican Satellite Corporation. However, RCA recently decided
against proceeding with its conditional authority. See also Issues for the 80s: A
Report Prepared for the Commission on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess., Y4. F761.; Alternatives to Intelsat Favored by FCC, BROADCASTING 136-140
(April 8, 1985); and Will There Be Room on the ARC? SCIENCE MAGAZINE 1043 (March
9, 1984).
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Arguments for deregulation, primarily advocated by highly developed
countries, surround diversity, innovation, and lower costs.0 The latter issue
invariably becomes the most germane, given the fact that competition may
apparently make technology and equipment more financially accessible to
all. Amongst those favoring deregulation, reservations arise upon the ability
of INTELSAT to meet the needs of a low-cost system in less-developed coun-
tries." It has been argued, for example, that INTELSAT's ownership and
technical arrangements favor "big" users over "small" ones. Receiving dishes
subjected to the approval of the organization are financially inaccessible to
telecommunication entities in many countries. In addition, low-volume users
are charged the same amount per circuit as high-volume users 2 These two
facts add up to cost ineffectiveness for less-developed countries.
It is propounded then that competition, real or threatened, exerts pressure
on the incumbent organizations to innovate and align prices according to
specific market costs rather than monopoly profits 43 New systems in the
international market, it is held, can act not only as a catalyst for technological
progress and competitive costs, but increase diversity, and thus broaden choice
in the selection of the most appropriate type of system a given country is to
utilize.
However, many countries, mostly less-developed or developing ones, have
maintained an adamant stance against deregulation and multisystem interna-
tional services. Their justification for this position focuses on natural monopo-
ly, status quo desirability, cooperation, and potentially harmful externalities. 4
They assert that natural monopolies enjoy economies of scope and instill cer-
tain organizational habits and preferences 5
A global DBS organization would need to take several initiatives to pre-
vent similar problems. 6 First, "cream-skimming" must be forestalled. Cream-
40. Snow, Regulation to Deregulation: The Telecommunications Sector and Industrializa-
tion, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 282-283 (December 1985).
41. Naraine, WARC-ORB '85: Guaranteeing Access to the Geostationary Orbit, TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS POLICY 107 (June 1985).
42. MARTINEZ, supra note 17, at 5-7.
43. Snow, supra note 13, at 69.
44. Externalities are those costs or benefits not accounted for in cost functions, welfare
measures, and other decision-making methods applied to questions of policy. See
Snow, supra note 13, at 51-68, and supra note 40, at 283-285.
45. Snow, supra note 13, at 69.
46. The assumption is that a global DBS system will encounter the same kind of com-
petition presently faced by INTELSAT if no preventive steps are taken to eliminate
this problem. The discussion includes the possible solutions in the context of
establishing a global DBS system and is based on Snow's articles. See supra notes
13 and 40.
12 February 1988
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skimming refers to the underpricing rate structures used by competitors of
the same service on heavy traffic, such as North Atlantic or Pacific routes
that cause the existing international system to lose profits needed to subsidize
thin routes. One way in which a global DBS system could do this is by apply-
ing a pricing system that will reflect realistic demand-supply situation of
regional or national users. Real or perceived competition to a global network
could be staved off, and both less- and highly developed countries will benefit
by a realistic pricing scale. The Ramsey pricing method 47 could also be an
alternative to render a natural monopoly such as global DBS system sustainable
against competitive entry. If political concerns related to implementing a new
pricing system can be mitigated, the challenge of competitors in the global
satellite market could be effectively met.
Second, a global DBS system must remain technologically competitive.
To discourage the entry of other DBS firms (private or state-owned) into the
international or regional markets, cost studies by the global system should
be conducted to determine whether potential rivals have the same or better
technology, and whether the tariff structure is indeed competitive. Doing this
periodically will allow a global DBS organization to keep abreast of costs
and continually evolving telecommunications technology.
Yet another avenue that may be taken by a global DBS organization in
order to discourage competition would be to increase its service to less-
developed states and cultivate new markets.48 Taking into account the real
demand-supply situation and economic constraints of those countries, a global;
DBS system could accommodate those areas in several ways: by developing
more effective transponders and lower-cost earth stations,49 and through
transponder leasing, loans for telecommunication systems, and even subscriber
financing 0 For example, INTELSAT has made significant efforts in addressing
the needs of thinly routed, less-developed countries. Its VISTA service provides
connection of low-cost terminals to other parts of the country and the global
network as well. In addition, its Development Assistance Program (DAP) offers
consultation in telecommunication design, bargaining, and administration.5'
47. Ramsey theory of pricing is a mathematic formula and an explicit form of value-of-
service. In economies of scale, a monopolist's prices have to be marked above
marginal cost in inverse proportion to price elasticities of demand for respective
services in order to cover operating costs exactly. See Snow, supra note 13 for fur-
ther discussion.
48. Kavanaugh, Star WARCs and New Systems, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 93-105
(June 1986).
49. See VIA SATELLITE, supra note 7.
50. Gellerman, Subscriber Financing of Telecommunications Investment, TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS POLICY 51-56 (March 1986).
51. Pelton, Communications: Developing Nations Faster SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS 21
(July 1984).
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Given the high interest of less-developed countries in initiating DBS
systems, through application of a "user-conscious" pricing system, periodic
cost studies, and provision of incentives and assistance for less-developed coun-
tries, a global DBS organization could ensure the attainment of the benefits
of satellite communication by many who would not enjoy them otherwise.
Further, these measures would allow a global DBS system to maintain an ample
level of immunity to competition.
VI. COORDINATION
Current trends toward privatization may be seen as a significant indica-
tion of increased competition in providing DBS services, increased demand
for utilization of the GSO spectrum resource, and consequently, an intensifica-
tion of coordination procedures. The privatization of BT, Inc. of Britain echoes
the philosophy of U.S. telecommunications policy.52 The "release" of Nip-
pon Telegraph and Telephone from governmental auspices in Japan, as well
as several developments in France, Spain, Luxembourg, Sweden, Norway,
Finland, and Iceland allude to the fact that respective governments stand to
lose not a small amount of direct bureaucratic, legislative, and executive control
over their DBS telecommunications systems.53 Resultant in this liberation of
sorts is a race towards space, and into the arena of facilitating national DBS
communication.
The topic of coordination goes beyond the distribution of a scarce com-
modity. Signal spill-over and, consequently, national sovereignty and prior
consent, are topics that have been and are being wrestled with in the interna-
tional arena. Even with the WARC-1971 agreements on spill-over and in-
terference, and principles enshrined in the U.N. constitution concerning the
free flow of information and prior consent, unintended spill-over and national
sovereignty is not guaranteed.5 4 The trend toward privatization makes this even
truer, and makes the search for and implementation of technology and pro-
cedures to alleviate these relevant concerns even more urgent. Ahead, we pro-
pose alternatives that may adequately diminish problems of coordination
arising within a global/regional DBS system.
In an effort to prevent illegal satellite reception of certain broadcasts, many
U.S. programming suppliers such as Home Box Office, SHOWTIME, 55 TBS,
and others, along with cable operators, are considering or have already
52. America's Deregulation Gospel Winning Converts Worldwide, BROADCASTING 68-69
(February 3, 1986).
53. Snow, supra note 40, at 288; and supra note 10.
54. W.J. HOWELL, JR., WORLD BROADCASTING IN THE AGE OF THE SATELLITE 264-269 (1986)
and MATTE, supra note 2, at 96-98.
55. Ready, Set...Scramble, SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS 20-21 (June 1985).
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employed the use of the M/A Com scrambler.56 Not only does it exclude
undesired signal transmissions, but, through a DBS control center, decoders
may be activated and deactivated. 5 7 On a greater scale, ARABSAT currently
scrambles its uplink telemetry system in order to prevent unfriendly inter-
ference and take-over of its space-craft.58 Further, ARABSAT decision makers
have considered scrambling the network's commercial television broadcasts
in order to avoid problems inherent in the reception of unacceptable program
content by countries within the same footprint.
59
Another means by which to deal with the problem of spill-over involves
the use of receive-only dishes. As an example, Pan-European telecasts of a
foreign source are limited through a ban on this type of signal receptor.6 0 In
addition to this type of regulation, the same result is had by the prohibition
of cable operators from relaying unwanted broadcasts, the requiring of com-
mercial strippage, and the imposition of carriage fees.61
Integral to the concerns of sovereignty and cultural invasion is the pro-
blem of program content, which first surfaced in early 1970 when a global
DBS system was considered by the ITU 2 However, a proposed global/regional
DBS system, as a common-carrier, could effectively resolve this problem.
Since a common-carrier arrangement will not interfere with the content being
carried by the system, this will provide individual countries with program-
ming autonomy.
In conjunction with scrambling technology, and regulations on receiving
equipment, a common-carrier global DBS system could be highly beneficial
in transmission and sustenance of political, economic, and cultural integrity
of individual states. Although the utilization of scrambling technology and
the necessary satellite ground equipment may increase the initial costs of a
global DBS network, the benefits of this will far outweigh the costs. Moreover,
costs incurred may prove to be miniscule when absorbed on a global scale
by participating nations. Although initiatives and technology such as these
do not relate to cooperation or coordination directly, they seem to guarantee
the preservation of the national sovereignty of those countries concerned with
doing so. However, as a result of this, the cooperative and coordinating
activities necessary for establishing a global/regional DBS system could be
enhanced.
56. Cable Scrambling Group Crumbles as TBS Pulls Out, ELECTRONIC MEDIA 1, 22
(October 14, 1985).
57. Covens, DBS Control Center: Simple Yet Complex, VIA SATELLITE 24-25 (April 1986).
58. ARABSAT Satellite's Control Signals Will Be Encrypted, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE
TECHNOLOGY 176-177 (May 21, 1984).
59. MARTINEZ, supra note 17, at 21.
60. Supra note 10.
61. Id.
62. QUEENEY, supra note 2, at 45-63.
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VII. EQUITABLE ACCESS
The issue of equitable access hangs over former agreements and resolu-
tions guaranteeing all ITU member countries equal access to the geostationary
arc and the frequency bands allocated for DBS use. Indeed, these written
agreements were the driving force behind the recent establishment of arc-
allotment planning of Fixed Satellite Services.6 3 A priori versus a posteriori
planning has long been the focus of debate between highly developed and
less-developed countries. Although no country has expressed dissatisfaction
regarding the a priori plan of allocating DBS channels in individual regions,
it could still be an issue for establishing a global DBS system.
Highly developed states maintain that a priori allotment of orbital slots
is an inefficient use of a limited resource,64 because many of those who ad-
vocate this position will never be able to make immediate use of the space
given, considering the initial costs65 and technology of national DBS systems.
A priori planning, it is claimed, can deny those facilities (orbital slots) to
those who may need and make efficient use of them (namely, private entities)
in the near future, and freezes technological development.6 6 It is concluded
that planning flexibility-allotting arc space on a "first-come, first-served"
basis-is essential to the advent of new technology, optimum cost-effectiveness,
and efficient use of the GSO.
Lesser-developed countries desire a priori planning to further ensure
access to the GSO. As telecommunication is viewed as increasingly essential
for participation in world affairs, satellite communication is seen as a viable
means to this end. A priori planning relieves the possibility of preemption,
and allows less-developed nations greater ability to determine the economic
and technical parameters of the telecommunications system they require.
6 7
To establish a global DBS system, and solve the ambivalence between
a priori and a posteriori planning, it is important to keep in mind two main
63. Space WARC Reaches a Consensus, BROADCASTING 40-41 (September 16, 1985).
64. MARTINEZ, supra note 17, at 7-8.
65. Based on the financial plans of the U.S. potential DBS operators, the implementa-
tion of a national DBS system would cost between $200 and $700 million contingent
upon the complexity and the requirements of the system. These figures include
space and ground segments and launch costs. But the estimation does not include
the costs of programming, marketing, and leasing or distributing the receiving earth
stations. Adding these operating expenses, it was projected that the cost of a na-
tional DBS system could be much higher. Federal Communications Commission,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, FC.C. 82-498 December 3, 1982, 43-46.
66. Mahoney, supra note 11.
67. Segal, supra note 4, and MARTINEZ, supra note 17.
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objectives.6 8 Those less-developed countries need to have guaranteed access
to suitable places on the arc, even though it will likely be distant future when
they will be able to use them. Concurrently, those countries that do anticipate
DBS utilization in the near future should not be penalized, i.e., relegated to
"latecomer" status. Simultaneously, technological development and growth
should be fostered. There are measures through which a global DBS organiza-
tion may coordinate these goals for less-developed and highly developed
nations.
To best meet these objectives, a global DBS organization could establish
regional, multiadministrative entities. Such a global DBS network with
regional associations would relax the utilizing of the GSO for national DBS
purposes, and thus lessen the burden of the resource and coordinating bodies-
guaranteeing equitable access for less-developed, developing, and highly
developed states.
Moreover, the institution of regional systems between cooperating na-
tions further promises access, and is politically conceivable (as ARABSAT
and EUTELSAT exemplify), since regional systems would be composed of
a fewer number of countries, in close proximity, who may share similar goals
and interests 9 Regional systems may be economically attractive, too, par-
ticularly to states in which the financial burden of initiating a national DBS
network is too great to bear alone. Through financing cooperation, space seg-
ment costs could be met, and ground equipment could be bought according
to the needs of the individual country. Multilateral planning sessions could
be undertaken to coordinate requirements of these nations' DBS system on
those bands designated for allotment. 0
Such initiatives on the part of a global DBS organization will not only
guarantee access for all users, but promote effective use of the GSO spec-
trum, and preserve, to a degree, flexibility in the system, promoting growth
and innovation. Thus, a global DBS system, possessing regional, multiad-
ministrative bodies is an alternative that may be politically, technically, and
economically propitious to all.
VHI. SUMMARY
Observing now the real possibility of effectively addressing old and new
issues related to DBS communication-competition, coordination, and equi-
68. Naraine, supra note 41, at 106.
69. Wigand, supra note 5, at 254; Powell, supra note 3, at 34.
70. BROADCASTING articles, supra notes 9 and 11.
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table access (incorporating free flow of information, national sovereignty, prior
consent, spill-over, privatization, politicization, and a priori v. a posteriori
planning)-it is now time to refocus efforts toward establishing a global/regional
DBS system.
To review, reasons for reassessment are due to the rise of debates over
equitable access on the FSS, risks surrounding the initiation of national DBS
systems, privatization of the DBS market (and consequences of competition
and coordination), and the politicization of international negotiations. These
matters make crucial the necessity for international cooperation. It is argued
here that a global DBS system could be instrumental in addressing these prob-
lems, as well as those concerns related to competition, coordination, and
equitable access. In order to be successful, a global DBS organization must
enact several measures.
The spectre of competition may be dealt with by the global DBS organiza-
tion in three main ways: by instituting a pricing system that reflects a realistic
demand-supply situation of regional or national users; by conducting inter-
mittent cost and technology studies to prevent cream-skimming and encourage
technological development; and by offering financing assistance and incen-
tives to those nations that need them.
A common-carrier type of global DBS system may also forestall prob-
lems arising with coordination. This may be done by utilizing scrambling
technology and enforcing regulations on receive-only dishes. These two
methods may prove useful in preventing spill-over and violation of the cultural,
political, or economic sovereignty of individual states.
Equitable access could be guaranteed to highly and less-developed coun-
tries through a global DBS system. Although the conflict of a priori and a
posteriori planning has been resolved by the allocation of DBS channels and
orbital spaces among regional countries, the "globalization" and "regionaliza-
tion" of DBS communication networks will conserve and share the GSO
resource more effectively. While coordinating requirements of different systems
through multiadministrative organizations, a global DBS system may also
maintain an adequate degree of planning flexibility for modification.
Devoting efforts towards deterring competition, problems of coordina-
tion, and ensuring access to all should be the primary objectives of a global
DBS system. As shown, such a system is achievable from a technical and
economic standpoint. Much of the debate that delays implementation of a
global DBS system stems mainly from political conflicts-many of which may
be mitigated and resolved not only through concerted, common-goal orienta-
tion in negotiations, but also by employing the aforementioned solutions. The
time has come to take steps in the direction of renewed international coopera-
tion, allowing all nations to realize increased development, progress, and
quality of life through a global DBS system.
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